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TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: A FEDERAL
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PHYSICIAN AID-IN-DYING
Todd David Robichaud*
INTRODUCTION
"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."' With
these words, the Supreme Court introduced Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey,2 its most significant opinion on abortion since
Roe v. Wade.3 In addition to affirming a woman's freedom from
unduly burdensome government intrusion in pre-viability
abortions, Casey exposes a potential crisis in the states caused
by the failure to protect Supreme Court tested and approved
rights.4 Absent federal involvement, constitutional rights often
remain in doubt. Abortion is one of these rights. As this Note
contends, so too is the right to die. It is perhaps not surprising
that the discussion of abortion lends itself to euthanasia as
well. Both issues demand the consideration of life and,
concomitantly, death.5
* Associate Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 27,
1994. A.B. 1991, University of Chicago; J.D. 1994, University of Michigan Law
School. I would like to thank my Note Editor, Alma Lowry, and Professor Anthony
Amarose at the University of Chicago for their helpful comments on earlier versions
of this Note. Finally, this Note is dedicated to the memory of my mother and father,
each of whom were lost to cancer. Their courage inspires us all to promulgate more
humane laws.
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992).
2. Id. at 2791.
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2803 (citations omitted) (noting that "[nineteen] years
after our holding that the Constitution protects a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy in its early stages, that definition of liberty is still questioned").
5. There are those who believe that the abortion precedent is not an appropriate
analogy for euthanasia, since abortive procedures do not effect a living being. See,
e.g., Joseph P. Shapiro & David Bowermaster, Death on Trial, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Apr. 25, 1994, at 31, 39. This is debatable. In Casey, the Court characterized
the state's authority to regulate the practice of abortion as an interest in the
potentiality of human life. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819-20. Those who argue that
abortion is not a proper analogy for euthanasia also ignore the fact that under certain
circumstances a woman may elect to abort after the point of fetal viability. Finally,
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The controversy surrounding Dr. Jack Kevorkian's role in
the deaths of twenty individuals' is reflective of the right-to-
die debate itself. Armed with his lethal "Mercitron," Kevorkian
has vowed to continue to help suffering patients7 despite the
State of Michigan's criminal ban on assisted suicide.8 Unlike
his clinician colleagues, Kevorkian, a non-clinician, does not
have access to the resources of a fully equipped medical
facility to "treat" his patients. Some of those who wish to
enlist the services of Kevorkian consequently have been forced
to forsake the refuge of a hospital in favor of a cot in the back
of a rusting Volkswagen van.9
In many ways, the parallels between Kevorkian's van and
the pre-Roe abortion mills are striking. Both were illegal. The
services each provides were, and are, frequently performed,
despite their illegality. And like its back-alley counterpart,
Kevorkian's van is unsanitary, and ostensibly beyond the
sweep of State regulatory bodies. John O'Hair, the Michigan
prosecutor who pursued the criminal conviction of Kevorkian,
suggested that Kevorkian's patients are subjected to inhumane
conditions.'0 In response to his prosecution, Kevorkian
this criticism misconstrues the intention of the comparison. Since the abortion
decisions offer the most comprehensive treatment of due process protection for liberty
interests in recent times, their value for predicting future analyses by the Court is
considerable. The liberties implicated in abortion substantially are similar to
physician aid-in-dying, thus making a suitable point of reference. This argument is
shared by at least one federal court. In deciding the federal constitutionality of the
State of Washington's criminal prohibition of physician assistance-in-dying, the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington found that although Casey did
not specifically contemplate applicability to assisted suicide, the High Court's
reasoning was nevertheless "highly instructive and almost prescriptive" on the issue
of physician aid-in-dying. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, No. C94-119R, slip op.
at 11 (W.D. Wash. May 3, 1994) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform). The District Court concluded that a suffering patient "cannot be
deemed any less intimate or personal, or any less deserving of protection from
unwarranted governmental interference, than that of a pregnant woman." Id. at 12.
A similar suit has been filed in New York challenging that state's ban on assisted
suicide. The plaintiffs, two men suffering from AIDS, one woman dying of cancer, and
three physicians, claim that the law "'denies individuals the liberty and privacy to
decide what to do with their own bodies.'" Ronald Sullivan, Suit Challenges New
York's Law Banning Doctor-Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1994, at B3.
6. Judy Pasternak, Kevorkian's Assisted-Suicide Trial Opens, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
20, 1994, at A20.
7. Judy Pasternak, Michigan Brings Charges Against Suicide Doctor, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 1993, at Al, A12.
8. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 751.1027(1) (1993).
9. Pamela Warrick, Suicide's Partner, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at El, E8.
10. Rogers Worthington, Suicide Doctor Finally to Have Day in Court, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 18, 1993, at A2. At a press conference after the decision to bring the first set of
Physician Aid-in-Dying
remarked, "[physician aid-in-dying] is not a matter of law,
legislators, ethicists, theologians, or philosophers. It's a medi-
cal matter."'
To suffering persons, Kevorkian's statement is persuasive.
Physician aid-in-dying is unquestionably a medical concern.'
2
The fact that individuals consult their physicians and ask for
assistance in ending an intolerable existence is strong evi-
dence that patients view assisted death as an appropriate
medical matter. A 1991 study conducted by the Harvard
University School of Public Health in conjunction with the
Boston Globe shows that a large percentage of the population
perceive an appreciable difference between doctors who assist
patients in life and death decisions and those individuals who
render assistance without the requisite medical training and
background. 3 Sixty-four percent of those polled favored the
legalization of physician aid-in-dying. 4 However, only thirty-
seven percent of those polled thought assistance by a relative
or close friend should be permitted. 5
The medical profession does, and should, enjoy a presump-
tion that its efforts are in the best interests of a patient. This
presumption logically extends to the legal status of physician
aid-in-dying as well. But Kevorkian is mistaken when he
argues that medical matters are not the affairs of government.
Courts have long recognized that individual liberties must be
criminal charges against Kevorkian for his assistance in the death of Thomas Hyde,
O'Hair commented " [w ]hen you think of Mr. Hyde over on Belle Isle, essentially with
a stranger, in [Kevorkian's] rusty van inhaling carbon monoxide as a means of ending
his life .... It seems to me that this is exactly the type of thing we want to avoid."
Id.
11. Id.
12. In his declaration to the United States District Court for the Western District
of Washington, Dr. John P. Geyman, Professor Emeritus at the University of Wash-
ington School of Medicine and member of the coalition challenging the constitutional
validity of the Washington statute, stated: "(Plersons who seek to hasten death by
consuming drugs need medical counseling... knowing what drug, in what amount,
will hasten death for a particular patient, in light of the patient's medical condition
and medication regimen is a complex medical task." Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, No. C94-119R, slip op. at 5 (W.D. Wash. May 3, 1994) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
13. Richard A. Knox, Poll: Americans Favor Mercy Killing, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
3, 1991, at 1, 22.
14. Id.
15. Id. Professor Dan Brock of Brown University believes that the study demon-
strates the public's confidence in the medical profession to act responsibly. Brock
argues that it is preferable for society to restrict the authority to a group that has the
professional training and norms which tend to minimize abuse. Id.
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balanced against countervailing state interests. 6 It is precisely
because physician assistance-in-dying has such irrevocable
consequences that governmental protection is needed. Medi-
cine should not be exempt from social or penal codes.
The problem created by doctors like Kevorkian is more
pervasive than it might initially appear. He is not alone. Many
physicians are confronted with requests for death. 7 Some,
including Dr. Timothy Quill of Rochester, New York, are
publicly open to the idea of assisting their patients to cope
with dying and, potentially, to die.'8 A recent study surveying
Rhode Island physicians' attitudes toward assisted suicide
reveals that twelve percent have been asked by patients to
administer a lethal injection, and twenty-eight percent would
comply with such requests if the practice were legalized.' 9 Yet,
evidence of physician willingness to administer a lethal
injection is not dispositive. More important is the notion that
physician aid-in-dying as a medical decision is deserving of
judicial and legislative latitude. Despite Justice Scalia's fear
that imposing a "background of federal constitutional imper-
atives" will confuse the issue and embroil physician aid-in-
dying in a controversy similar to abortion, ° the prospect of
subjecting ailing individuals to Kevorkian's death machine or
other means of surreptitious, illegal physician-assisted suicide
should motivate a federal alternative. A more perfect union
demands no less.
It is in this spirit of reform that this Note argues for the
constitutional protection of physician assistance-in-dying
under the Due Process Clause.21 This Note maintains that
16. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1982); Mills v. Rogers,
457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905); In
re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985); Delio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr.,
516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
17. See Timothy E. Quill, Doctor, I Want to Die. Will You Help Me?, 270 JAMA
870, 870 (1993).
18. Id. at 873.
19. Terry R. Fried et al., Limits of Patient Autonomy: Physician Attitudes and
Practices Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatments and Euthanasia, 153 ARCH. INTERN.
MED. 722, 726 (1993).
20. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.'261, 292-93 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
21. For more general discussions of a constitutional right to physician-assisted
suicide see James Bopp, Jr., Is Assisted Suicide Constitutionally Protected?, 3 IssuEs
L. & MED. 113 (1987); Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitu-
tional?, 23 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32 (1993); Yale Kamisar, When Is There A Consti-
tutional "Right to Die"? When Is There No Constitutional "Right To Live"?, 25 GA. L.
REV. 1203 (1991); Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DuQ.
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terminally ill or suffering patients should be allowed to
challenge state statutes prohibiting physician aid-in-dying as
a violation of their rights under the Constitution and the laws
of the United States by filing a federal claim pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The reasons for undertaking a section 1983 suit
are twofold. First, given the Supreme Court's failure to define
precisely the parameters of competent decisions to die, a
federal cause of action would force further consideration of the
issue by the Court. Second, a section 1983 suit seeking
injunctive relief against a state prosecutor would insulate
physicians from criminal liability and would in all likelihood
lead to greater medical compliance with patient requests for
death.
Part I of this Note investigates the possible foundations of
a constitutional right to physician aid-in-dying triggering
section 1983 protection and the opposing state interests in
preventing suicide. Part II examines the nature and scope of,
and obstacles to a request for section 1983 relief. Finally, Part
III focuses on the public policy implications associated with
recognizing a federal cause of action.
Before proceeding to more substantive areas, it is important
to detail the theoretical posture of this Note. The purpose of
this preface is to avoid any misconceptions or ambiguities that
might otherwise result. The primary concern of this Note is
not whether physician aid-in-dying is normatively desirable,
but rather to determine what the logical extensions to Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health22 might be for the more
humane administration of suffering individuals who would like
to choose the time and place of their deaths. As the literature
in the field on the ethics of euthanasia is already exhaustive,
this commentary presupposes, as did Cruzan, that a competent
individual has a constitutionally safeguarded right to refuse
life-saving medical treatment.23 Fully cognizant of the profu-
sion of conflicting precedent on the issue, the Note limits its
discussion to instances where the patient is competent,24
L. REV. 1 (1985); Thomas W. Mayo, Constitutionalizing the "Right to Die", 49 MD. L.
REV. 103 (1990).
22. 497 U.S. 261 (1993).
23. Id. at 278.
24. These requirements ensure that an individual patient is minimally capable
of autonomous decision making. Unfortunately, such a standard precludes participa-
tion by those who may be suffering the most: Alzheimer's patients, the mentally
impaired, newborns, and those surviving in a persistent vegetative state. Proxy
decision making or substituted judgment by a court, guardian ad litem, friend, or
WINTER 1994]
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where evidence of the patient's desires is unequivocal,25 where
the patient is free of duress, coercion or undue influence, 6 and
where there is a legitimate medical basis for the participation
of a physician. Furthermore, this Note takes the position
that the differences between active and passive conduct,28 and
ordinary and extraordinary treatments29 are merely a matter
of semantics. Justice Scalia best summarized this position
when he wrote in Cruzan that "Starving oneself to death is no
different from putting a gun to one's temple as far as the
common-law definition of suicide is concerned; the cause of
death in both cases is the suicide's conscious decision to "puRl
even close relative are similarly flawed. Advanced directives, such as living wills,
should be permitted so long as they are devised at a time when the patient is
competent. While this model may seem overly pedantic and exacting, it is necessary
as both a check against abuse and as a means of legitimately upholding individual
patient decision making.
25. This element is consonant with the reasoning underlying Cruzan's clear and
convincing evidentiary burden. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. Well aware of Justice
O'Connor's reminder that Cruzan is germane only to the practices of the State of
Missouri, id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring), this Note maintains that such a policy
should be adopted at the federal level because it protects autonomy while
simultaneously discouraging ill-considered or impulsive decisions.
26. Given the increased susceptibility of suffering patients to manipulation, any
federal proposal must be designed to combat any invidious abuse. Such a require-
ment, even if imperfect, should placate critics' fears of euthanasia for the convenience
of others.
27. A legitimate medical basis is defined as any terminal condition, or non-termi-
nal medical affliction which causes an individual to suffer from severe and constant
pain.
28. Compare Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Although] the
distinction between action and inaction has some bearing upon the legislative
judgment of what ought to be prevented ... it would seem to me unreasonable to
draw the line precisely between action and inaction. . . .") and James Rachels, Active
and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEw ENG. J. MED., 78, 80 (1975) ("[It is not exactly
correct to say that in passive euthanasia the doctor does nothing, for he does do one
thing that is very important: he lets the patient die.") with Bouvia v. Superior Court,
225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (2d Dist. 1986) ("[A]llow[ingl nature to take its course is not
equivalent to an election to commit suicide with real parties aiding and abetting
therein.") and Yale Kamisar, Active v. Passive Euthanasia: Why Keep the Distinction?,
TRIAL, Mar. 1993, at 32, 37 ("[T]his [active-passive] distinction has become an integral
part of the medicolegal landscape .... This is not the way I would have liked to
resolve the controversy ... but it may nevertheless be a pragmatic and defensible
way to do so.").
29. Compare In re Conroy, 464 A.2d 303, 311 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983)
(N[Alnasogastric tube [is] no more than a simple device which [is] part of... routine
nursing care. It [is] not really 'medical treatment' at all."), rev'd on other grounds, 486
A.2d 1209 (1985) with Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288-89 (O'Connor J., concurring)
("Artificial feeding cannot readily be distinguished from other forms of medical
treatment.").
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an end to his own existence."" Finally, the Note is predicated
on the opinion that physicians are the principal actors in
patient assisted deaths. Little attention is given to other
medical personnel who also attend to patients. This omission,
however, does not reflect a desire to preclude more ancillary
health care staff from participation if they so choose. Many, if
not all, of the arguments presented are equally applicable to
medical persons other than doctors. Mindful of the burden this
responsibility places upon physicians, this Note nevertheless
contends that doctors who take part in physician aid-in-dying
should remain involved from beginning to end.
I. BASES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF
PHYSICIAN AID-IN-DYING
Patient challenges to state prohibitions against physician
aid-in-dying are properly predicated upon the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of due process.3' Conduct explicitly is
violative of due process if a person, patient or otherwise,
suffers a deprivation of a protected liberty interest.32 In the
alternative, a patient might contend that federal relief is
necessary to preserve the privacy of the physician-patient
relationship from unwarranted and burdensome state inter-
ference.
The language of the Fourteenth Amendment is purposefully
broad. Declining to enumerate specific rights within the
purview of due process reserves to contemporary society the
power to tailor the Constitution to newly recognized liberties.
In order to pass constitutional muster under the Due Process
Clause, a law must be both reasonably related to the regulated
activity and in the interest of the community.33
30. Cruzan, 497 US. at 296-97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 189 (1854)).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. The Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part: "No State shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " Id.
33. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
WINTER 19941
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A. The Liberty Interest Implicated in
Physician Aid-in-Dying
Before an individual is deprived of a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty, the Fourteenth Amendment provides the right
to a hearing.34 Since the early 1900s, the Supreme Court has
been reluctant to extend the substantive reach of the Due
Process Clause.35 Thus, when a due process claim arises in an
untested context, the Supreme Court engages in a two-pronged
analysis.36 First, the Court determines the private interest
threatened; then it balances that interest against the state
interest in regulating the behavior.37 Traditionally, the Court
has extended due process protection only to those rights found
to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"38 or "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. " "
The most recent framework for determining the status of a
particular liberty is found in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.4 °
The Court wrote:
[Matters which] involv[e] the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.4'
34. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-78 .(1971).
35. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963) (noting that a law does
not violate due process by being unwise or burdensome); Lincoln Federal Labor Union
v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 533-34 (1949) (finding that state
laws guaranteeing the right to unionize do not violate due process); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148 (1938) (upholding a Congressional prohibition
on the sale of imitation milk products); West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 391-92
(upholding a minimum wage for women); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (cautioning against extending
substantive rights under the due process clause).
36. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 US. 261, 278-79 (1990).
37. Id.
38. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); accord Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
39. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989);
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
40. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
41. Id. at 2807.
528
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The Court's language easily embraces the right of a competent
person to decide to die with medical assistance. If, as Casey
indicates, marriage, procreation, contraception, child rearing,
and other matters indirectly affecting our lives are impliedly
part of ordered liberty,42 then certainly decisions which
directly affect our lives, such as the choice between life and
death, should be similarly protected. The Court conceded this
in Cruzan. In writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
commented that "[tihe choice between life and death is a
deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming
finality. '43 To now hold that a suffering individual may not
avail herself of physician assistance to effectuate a deeply
personal decision to die would be incongruous."
The controversy does not end here. Even if one concludes
that assisted deaths are not central to personal dignity and
autonomy, the question remains whether such an inquiry is
appropriate in the first place. Some courts have found the first
prong of the Court's test to be wanting.45 Continued reference
by the courts to practices customary at the time of the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 46  needlessly
confines the amendment to antiquity. One of the most
persuasive as well as most recent commentaries on this retro-
spective methodology is found in Michigan v. Kevorkian.47 In
evaluating the constitutionality of Michigan's statute crim-
inalizing assisted suicide, Judge Richard Kaufman concludes
that:
[An exclusively historical analysis] would place a
straightjacket upon the Constitution, and not permit it to
42. Id.
43. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
44. It is argued by some critics that it is a philosophical contradiction for a
person to end his life in the course of exercising autonomy because in addition to
destroying his body, he destroys the autonomy he held out to be so paramount.
Without launching into an involved philosophical discourse, this contention can be
easily refuted. First, this argument persists in the continued distinction between
passive and active assistance, rejected earlier. See supra notes 28-30 and
accompanying text. Second, persons who refuse life-saving treatment and elect to
"passively" end their lives exercise the same autonomy-destroying autonomy as those
persons who engage in more active conduct. The double standard logically and legally
cannot stand.
45. Michigan v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 (Mich Cir. Ct. Dec.
13, 1993).
46. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294 (Scalia, J., concurring).
47. No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1993).
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be the living, dynamic document that has endured for more
than 200 years ... a document that permits protection of
fundamental liberty and personal privacy, even when
history and tradition would severely intrude in these
areas.
48
Judge Kaufman notes that even the Supreme Court has, on
occasion, rejected this approach. 49  Evidence of the Court's
inconsistent stance on due process can be found in Loving v.
Virginia,5 ° where Virginia's laws banning interracial marriage
were struck down as unconstitutional.5 Loving recognizes that
the specific practices of the states at the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment's ratification are not the exclusive
demarcation of safeguarded liberties.52
Other decisions by the Court dismissing a strict historical
examination to determine the reach of constitutional rights
include matters as pivotal as the right to trial by jury,53 deseg-
regation, 4 and birth control.55 Thus, a conclusion that assisted
suicide was illegal in 1868 should not be a per se bar to further
consideration of the issue.
48. Id. at *7.
49. Id.; see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1991) ("It
is also tempting ... to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those
practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against government
interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. But
such a view would be inconsistent with our law.") (citations omitted).
50. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
51. Id. at 12. With respect to the protected Fourteenth Amendment interest
implicated by interracial marriages, the Court in Casey wrote:
Marriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage
was illegal in most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no doubt
correct in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected against state interfer-
ence by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause in Loving v.
Virginia.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805.
52. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
53. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968).
54. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). But see Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (expressly adhering to the historical approach in holding that
"to claim that a right to engage in [sodomy] is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious").
530
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B. The Privacy Interest Implicated
in Physician Aid-in-Dying
The right to privacy as developed by Griswold v. Connecticut56
and its progeny provides formidable constitutional motivation
for legitimizing the role of physicians in patient euthanasia.
At their core, In re Quinlan,57 the first case involving a request
to remove a patient from life support equipment, and its
counterparts reflect this.58 Indeed, one court was persuaded
that:
The constitutional right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an
expression of the sanctity of individual free choice and self-
determination as fundamental constituents of life. The
value of life as so perceived is lessened .. .by the failure
to allow a competent human being the right of a choice.59
Even though explicit mention of privacy is lacking in the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "a
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or
zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution."' 0 This
privacy interest is implicitly grounded in the substantive
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.61
56. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court located the privacy interest in the penumbras
of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments. Id. at 484-85.
57. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
58. Id. at 662-64; see also Tune v. Walter Reed Army Med. Hosp., 602 F. Supp.
1452, 1456 (D.D.C. 1985); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987);
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Bartling v.
Glendale Adventist Hosp., 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); In re Severns,
425 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Del. Ch. 1980); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth,
452 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Brophy
v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977); In re Farell,
529 A.2d 404,410 (N.J. 1987); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (N.J. 1987); In re Conroy,
486 A.2d 1201, 1222 (N.J. 1985); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809,
814 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1980); In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738, 741-42 (Wash. 1983). But see
In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 296-97 (Ill. 1989)(declining to address the
constitutional right to privacy because its parameters are unclear).
59. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
60. Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113, 152 (1973). The Court later commented that "Roe
... [is] a rule ... of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity
to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or
to bar its rejection." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2810 (1992).
61. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
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Seven areas have been expressly identified as fundamental
liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment or by the
Constitution generally: the rights to procreation, 62 contracep-
tion,63 abortion,"' marriage, 65 the formation of a family,66 child
rearing," and education. The doctor-patient relationship is
conspicuously absent. Nonetheless, strong precedent exists to
suggest that medical decision making by a patient in consul-
tation with a physician ought to be a privacy-protected activity.
In Whalen v. Roe,68 the Court considered a New York State
statute requiring that all prescriptions written for "schedule
II" drugs, the most dangerous of the legal drugs which the
State found had a potential for abuse, be filed with the State.69
While the Court concluded that the statute was a permissible
exercise of the state's police power7 ° and did not violate a
constitutional privacy interest,7 two lines of thought emerged
which may facilitate the recognition of a privacy interest in
physician aid-in-dying. First, the Court failed to disturb the
lower courts' conclusion that "the doctor-patient relationship
is one of the zones of privacy accorded constitutional protec-
tion."72 The Supreme Court's omission could be construed to
include doctor-patient consultation, decision making and treat-
ment in the currently narrow scope of constitutionally protected
personal privacy. Supporting this interpretation is Paris Adult
Theater I v. Slaton,73 where the Court wrote:
[Tihe constitutionally protected privacy of family,
marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing is not
62. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
63. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Casey v. Population Serv.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
64. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. But see Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 US.
490, 520-21 (1989) (plurality opinion) (narrowing the privacy right established by Roe).
65. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965).
66. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977).
67. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
68. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
69. Id. at 592-93.
70. Id. at 598.
71. Id. at 603-04.
72. Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931,936 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (citations omitted). The court noted that
the expectation of privacy between doctor and patient is eclipsed only by that between
penitent and priest. Id. (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 170, 219 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
73. 413 U.S. 49, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
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just concerned with a particular place, but with a protected
intimate relationship. Such protected privacy extends to the
doctor's office, the hospital ... or as otherwise required to
safeguard the right to intimacy involved.74
Whalen also offers a more direct argument endorsing a
privacy interest in physician aid-in-dying. Joining the patients,
the attending physicians, relying on Doe v. Bolton,75 asked the
Court to resolve whether the statute unduly burdened their
right "to practice medicine free of unwarranted state
interference." 7' Noting that the doctors' claim was derivative
of, not independent from, their patients', the Court rejected this
contention." The Court had little difficulty distinguishing the
situation of these physicians from that of the physicians in
Bolton.7' The Court found that if impediments were not
burdensome to a patient's decision, but "merely made the
physician's work more laborious or less independent ... [the
statutes] would not have violated the Constitution."79 The locus
of the Court's constitutional appraisal was the impact on a
patient's privacy.
Statutes proscribing physician aid-in-dying satisfy Whalen's
requirements for an undue burden. Laws categorically pre-
venting patients from realizing their decision to end a painful
existence through the assistance of a personal physician are
overbroad. Since the impact is borne entirely by the patient,
such prohibitions are precisely the obstacles rejected by the
Whalen and Bolton course.
To speak about privacy, however, requires at least a rudi-
mentary understanding of the concept."0 In his now famous
dissent in Olmstead, Justice Brandeis referred to privacy as "the
right to be let alone .... , More recently, the Court noted the
existence of a "right to privacy, no less important than any other
74. Id. at 66 n. 13.
75. 410 US. 179 (1973); see id. at 197-98, 199.
76. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 (1977).
77. Id.
78. The Court maintained that the "statutory restrictions on the abortion proce-
dures were invalid because they encumbered the woman's exercise of that constitu-
tionally protected right by placing obstacles in the path of the doctor upon whom she
was entitled to rely for advice in connection with her decision." Id. at 605 n.33.
79. Id.
80. For a more comprehensive treatment of privacy interests, see Jed Rubenfeld,
The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737 (1989).
81. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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right carefully and particularly reserved to the people .... .82
This sentiment is also the animating force behind "the familiar
principle, so often applied by [the] Court that a 'governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject
to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms."'83 Despite the considerable attraction of a constitu-
tional right to privacy, an adequate definition of this right is
not readily apparent.
One of the most succinct and insightful commentaries is by
Professor Philip Kurland of the University of Chicago, who
writes:
The concept of a constitutional right of privacy still
remains largely undefined. There are at least three facets
that have been partially revealed, but their form and shape
remain to be fully ascertained. The first is the right of the
individual to be free in his private affairs from governmental
surveillance and intrusion. The second is the right of an
individual not to have his private affairs made public by the
government. The third is the right of an individual to be free
in action, thought, experience, and belief from governmental
compulsion.84
It is the freedom from state compulsion which most directly
concerns physician aid-in-dying.
The ideal of privacy includes both the positive, "the freedom
to," and the negative, "the freedom from," aspects of liberty. The
second component is overlooked frequently in the right-to-die
cases. It is nonetheless seriously implicated. A meaningful
analysis of the right to die should not preclude an examination
of the law's liberty-limiting or enhancing aspect. The law must
consider its compulsive effect on the lives of the citizenry.85
Lawmakers should proceed with caution when legislating
normative matters.8" Such caution is necessary to avoid a way
82. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
83. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,489 (1965) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama,
377 U.S. 288, 307 (1958)).
84. Philip B. Kurland, The Private I: Some Reflections on Privacy and the Consti-
tution, U. CHI. MAG., Autumn 1976, at 7, 8 (quoted in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599 n.24 (1977)).
85. Rubenfeld, supra note 80, at 739-40.
86. The Court admonished those who would devise or interpret laws according
to their own particular moral intuition, stating that: "Some of us as individuals find
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of life imposed by a "progressively more normalizing state."8 7
Laws which impose burdens that reshape a person's life violate
the right to privacy under author Jed Rubenfeld's theory."8 The
failure to recognize a constitutional right to die with physician
assistance imposes such an overwhelming burden on the life
of the person forced to obey. The fundamental question to be
addressed under this definition, therefore, is the extent to which
criminal prohibitions on physician aid-in-dying influence or
dominate the lives of individuals.8 9
The life of a person suffering from a painful affliction is a
classic example of a "life almost totally occupied" by the
consequences of laws against assisted deaths.9 ° If privacy is to
truly protect against intrusive state actions, then it must protect
the patient's decision to reject a life pervaded by pain.
Despite these thoughts, the right to privacy must be considered
against a post-Griswold backdrop of resistance to attempts to
construe privacy liberally. 91 Without elaboration, the Court noted
that any federal constitutional right to refuse life-saving medical
treatment "is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest" than as being "encompassed by
a generalized constitutional right of privacy ... ."9' The Court's
preference aside, ignoring the considerable state precedent to
the contrary93 would be unwise, particularly when the Court
itself counseled that the matter should be developed in the
laboratory of the states.94
abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our
decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1991).
87. Rubenfeld, supra note 80, at 784.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 785-87.
90. Id. at 795. For an explanation of the doctrinal differences between physician-
assisted suicide and "ordinary" suicide, see id. at 794-96.
91. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,189 (1986) (finding that state laws
prohibiting sodomy are constitutional). Yet Bowers' narrow interpretation of privacy
principles does not reject or abolish the already considerable case law. The court merely
declined to extend constitutional protection to the specific conduct of homosexual
sodomy. Id. at 190-92. As one commentator argues, "a decision to draw the line here
is nothing more than a judgment that this particular activity is either less fundamental
or more unsavory than the activities protected in prior cases." Rubenfeld, supra note
80, at 747 (emphasis in original).
92. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 n.7 (1990).
93. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
94. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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C. State Interest in Prohibiting Physician-Aid-in-Dying
Once a right is recognized as constitutional, a court must then
proceed to balance personal liberty interests against countervail-
ing state interests. This is the second step in reconciling an
alleged Due Process violation.95 Four state interests have been
identified in right to die cases: (1) the preservation of life, (2) the
protection of innocent third parties, (3) the maintenance of the
ethical integrity of the medical profession, and (4) the prevention
of suicide.96
1. The State Interest in the Preservation of Life-The seminal
case of Karen Ann Quinlan recognized that the interest in
preserving the life of a patient weakens as the degree of bodily
intrusion increases and the possibility of recovery decreases.9 7
Balancing the interests at stake requires a court to weigh the
value of life in and of itself against the quality of the individual's
life, where continued treatment will prolong a painful existence
brought on by disease." Although this appraisal might be more
sympathetic to a patient suffering from a terminal illness, the
rationale for overcoming the state interest is equally appropriate
for non-terminal cases.99
Proponents of the absolute sanctity of life frequently maintain
that patients who request judicial endorsement of their right
to die demand quality of life determinations, and that such
determinations are contrary to autonomous decision making
by the patient.'00 In Cruzan, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that
"a State may properly decline to make judgments about the
'quality' of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and
simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of
95. Id. at 279.
96. Superintendefit of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425
(Mass. 1977) (citing In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. President of Georgetown College, 377 U.S.
978 (1964)). At least one state, Nevada, recognizes a fifth compelling state concern
with respect to physician aid-in-dying: the interest in "encouraging the charitable and
humane care of those whose lives may be artificially extended under conditions which
have the prospect of providing at least a modicum of quality living." McKay v. Bergstedt,
801 P.2d 617, 621 (Nev. 1990).
97. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976); see also Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
at 425-26; In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1234-35 (N.J. 1985); In re Requena, 517 A.2d
886, 891 (N.J. 1986).
98. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 432.
99. See discussion infra Part III.C.
100. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 635 (Mass. 1986).
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human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected
interests of the individual."1"' The Chief Justice failed, however,
to appreciate the difference between a state's estimation of an
individual's life and its simple respect for a patient's quality
of life decision. The former threatens liberty interests. The
latter, by contrast, shows the utmost deference to the belief that
"[elvery human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body ... ."'0' It
is for the patient as rights-bearer to judge whether continued
existence will "demean or degrade" her humanity. 103
2. The State Interest in the Protection of Innocent Third
Parties-When an individual's conduct poses a harm to innocent
third parties, the state's interest in intervening to protect these
innocent lives is manifest.0 4 At one time, this state interest
operated as an absolute restraint on the liberty of an adult who
was the parent of a minor child. A decision by a parent or
guardian which might orphan a child was impermissible." 5 The
New York Court of Appeals concluded, however, that although
there is "no question that the State has an interest in protecting
the welfare of children ... the patient's right to decide the
course of his or her own medical treatment [is] not conditioned
on the patient being without minor children .... o6 The court
went on to say that a state cannot prohibit parents from
"engaging in dangerous activities because there is a risk that
their children will be left orphans."' 7 Thus, even this once insur-
mountable state interest has proven susceptible to mitigation.
3. The State Interest in Maintaining the Ethical Integrity
of the Medical Profession-Critics argue that physician aid-
in-dying violatives the fundamental tenet of medicine: above
all else do no harm.'0° The Hippocratic Oath, it is argued,
stands as a testament to this commitment to beneficence and
101. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990).
102. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)
(discussing the proposition that medical treatment without consent constitutes assault).
103. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 635.
104. Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 81 (N.Y. 1990) (stating that the state can
be expected to intervene to protect third parties from an individual's actions, but rarely
protects individuals from themselves).
105. See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C.
Cir. 1964); In re Dubreuil, 603 So. 2d 538, 540-41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
106. Fosmire, 551 N.E.2d at 83.
107. Id. at 84.
108. See Willard Gaylin et al., Doctors Must Not Kill, 259 JAMA 2139 (1988).
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non-maleficence.1"9 Medical students rarely study the Oath,
however, even in the context of ethics courses, and only forty-
eight percent of all medical schools include any version of the
Oath in graduation exercises.10 Moreover, the Oath holds
little practical guidance for modern medicine. In addition to
forbidding physicians from administering lethal medication,
the Oath precludes physician participation in abortions or
charging every student a fee for medical training."1 These
latter provisions are widely disregarded.
Standing in contrast to the more stringent canons of Hippoc-
rates are the Principles of Medical Ethics adopted by the
American Medical Association (AMA). 112 The Principles require
a doctor not only to render medical services "with compassion
and respect for human dignity," but also to "seek changes" in
the law when the law is "contrary to the best-interests of the
patient."" 3 The AMA guidelines strongly encourage, if not
demand, a physician to assist a patient to die if such action
medically is indicated and in the patient's best interests.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence comes from medical
practitioners themselves. In 1991, attorneys for the Hennepin
County Medical Center asked a court to appoint an indepen-
dent conservator to make medical decisions for eighty-seven
109. See, e.g., Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Physician Participation in
Capital Punishment, 270 JAMA 365, 365-68 (1993) (addressing the role of doctors
in capital punishment); John J. Ring, The Right Road for Medicine: Professionalism
and the New American Medical Association, 266 JAMA 1694, 1694 (1991) (examin-
ing the function of professionalism in the American Medical Association); Andrew A.
Skolnick, Health Professionals Oppose Rules Mandating Participation in Executions,
269 JAMA 721, 721-23 (1993) (responding to former U.S. Attorney General William
P. Barr's proposal for federal death sentences by lethal injection).
110. Lawrence K. Altman, Despite Many Shifts, Oath as Old as Apollo Endures
in Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1990, at C1.
111. In pertinent part, the Hippocratic Oath reads:
I swear... to teach [the children of my own teacher] this art [of medicine]-if
they so desire to learn it-without fee and covenant .... I will neither give a
deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this
effect. Similarly, I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy.
LuDWIG EDELSTEIN, ANCIENT MEDICINE (Owsei Temkin & C. Lilian Temkin eds., 1967).
For a discussion of the evolution of medical principles, see Edmund D. Pellegrino,
The Metamorphosis of Medical Ethics: a 30-year Retrospective, 269 JAMA 1158,
1158-62 (1993).
112. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
331-32 (2d ed. 1983).
113. Id.
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year-old Helga Wanglie. 1 4 Mrs. Wanglie was dependent on a
ventilator. The hospital sought to remove Mrs. Wanglie from
the respirator over the objections of her family." 5 Even in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence that Mrs. Wanglie
wished to discontinue ventilation," 6 doctors nevertheless
sought judicial intervention." 7 In rejecting the hospital's
claim, the court held that the testimony from physicians and
staff was "unconvincing." "' This professional inconsistency
suggests that federal or state reliance on medical standards in
limiting patient autonomy is misplaced.
4. The State Interest in Preventing Suicide-In Cruzan,
Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked that "a State is [not]
required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and
voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to
death."" 9 While the Chief Justice's statement may be inter-
preted as allowing a bright-line rule against assisted suicide,
this Note contends that physician aid-in-dying can be distin-
guished from Cruzan on two grounds. First, Cruzan is limited
to the death requests of a "physicially able adult."2 ° Even
though Nancy Beth Cruzan survived in a persistent vegetative
state, at no point did the plurality speak about state prohibi-
tions of assisted deaths in the context of a terminal or severely
debilitating disease. A federal cause of action for physician
assistance in the death of patients acknowledges the distinc-
tion between healthy, physically capable individuals referred
to in Cruzan and those who are not. Second, Justice Rehnquist
114. In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 28, 1991) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
115. Id. at 3.
116. The court found that "[alt no time when Helga Wanglie was conscious and
able to express her own wishes did any physician or staff member at the Hennepin
County Medical Center discuss her treatment preferences with her." Id.
117. Id. at 4. For additional discussions regarding the propriety of futile treat-
ment, see generally Allen J. Bennett, When is Medical Treatment 'Futile'?, 9 ISSUES
L. & MED. 35 (1993) (discussing examples of futile cases and the New York State "do
not resuscitate" law); Daniel Callahan, Medical Futility, Medical Necessity: The-
Problem-Without-A-Name, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 30 (discussing
the bioethical issues involved in futile medical treatment); Lawrence J. Schneiderman
et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 949 (1990) (defining when medical treatment should be considered futile);
Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill
Patients, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 955 (1984) (discussing recent efforts to define policies
on the use of life-sustaining procedures on hopelessly ill patients).
118. Wanglie, No. PX-91-283.
119. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990).
120. Id.
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addressed only the issue of self-imposed starvation.' 2 ' Entirely
absent from his discussion is the role of physician participa-
tion in patient deaths. Any attempt to read Cruzan's specific
holding as instructive on every instance of a patient decision
to die is far too extreme. The opinion must be read narrowly.
This Note also posits that a federal cause of action for
physician aid-in-dying can accommodate Cruzan's unwilling-
ness to approve the practice of suicide.' 22 In general, suicides
ought to be proscribed; however, when the situation involves
a seriously ill or terminal patient, compassion militates
against rigid adherence to tradition. The states have already
acknowledged this by consistently distinguishing physician-
assisted deaths from "ordinary" suicides.'23 Again, the single
most important theme emerging from the opinions is the
disparity between a healthy, productive life and a life racked
with pain and suffering.
II. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SECTION 1983
Title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code is the
principal vehicle for private citizens to secure constitutionally
ensured rights against infringement by states. In fiscal year
1960, only 287 section 1983 suits were filed in or removed to
federal district court. 24 By 1985, however, that number had
risen to 36,500.125 It is estimated that section 1983 litigation
121. Id.
122. See infra Part III.C.
123. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (stating that the patient's "decision to allow nature to take its course is not
equivalent to an election to commit suicide"); Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232,
1233, 1236 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (holding that a patient has a legal right to refuse
treatment); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 625-27 (Nev. 1990); In re Conroy, 486
A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985) (stating that "declining life-sustaining medical treatment
may not properly be viewed as an attempt to commit suicide"). It is unclear, however,
how these courts would address more active intervention, on a level analogous to
Kevorkian's, if a distinction between passive and active conduct by physicians is
legislated.
124. THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIMS 86 (2d ed.
1987) (citing Statistics Compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics During the 12 Month Period Ending
December 31, 1985, at A12).
125. Id. This figure includes 19,000 cases filed by prisoners.
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constitutes over ten percent of the federal court docket. 2 '
Congress created section 1983 as a remedy for deprivations of
federally protected rights caused by conduct of state officers.'27
A section 1983 cause of action arises when a person, acting
under color of any state statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage abridges the rights of any citizen guaranteed by the
federal Constitution and laws of the United States. 2 ' The
statute provides federal relief in three circumstances:
(1) where state laws are on their face constitutionally repug-
nant; (2) where state remedies are inadequate as written to
provide full relief; and (3) where state law, as implemented,
fails to provide relief.
129
A. The History of Section 1983
Section 1983 is a product of the Civil Rights Act of 187 1.13
Like the Civil War Amendments to the Federal Constitution,
section 1983 was enacted to counter the widespread discrimi-
nation against blacks in the American South. Originally enti-
tled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for
other Purposes,"' 3 ' the statute was Congress' method of con-
trolling the "campaign of violence and deception ... fomented
by the Ku Klux Klan ... ,,132 Given this backdrop, the courts
have consistently advanced the broad remedial power of
section 1983.33 While the Civil Rights Acts of 1871 and 1964
primarily addressed concerns of racial discrimination, neither
act has ever been construed so narrowly. To the contrary, any
126. George C. Pratt, Foreword to MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SEC-
TION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES vii, vii (1986).
127. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 179-80 (1961).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
129. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 100-01 (1980); McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-74.
130. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1873).
131. Id.
132. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985).
133. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) (citations omitted)
(holding that "[als remedial legislation, § 1983 is to be construed generously to
further its primary purpose"); Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (holding
that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action
under section 1983); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972) (holding that
section 1983 expressly authorizes federal injunctive relief against state action).
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violation of constitutional or statutory rights, including but
not limited to discrimination because of race, color, religion, or
national origin is a satisfactory basis for a section 1983
claim.'34 As stated in Mitchum v. Foster: "The very purpose of
§ 1983 [is] to interpose the federal courts between the States
and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to
protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of
state law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or
judicial.' ,135
B. The Elements of a Section 1983 Cause of Action
A section 1983 claim can only be pursued when the
deprivation of constitutional rights is attributable to a person
acting under color of state law. 36 The Supreme Court has
interpreted "under color of state law" to mean any abuse of
authority vested in an individual by virtue of state law and
exercised in his capacity as a state official. 3 v Section 1983
relief is unavailable when the alleged discrimination or
deprivation is the result of purely private conduct.18 A
private, non-state officer or employee who acts in concert with
a state agent to bring about the alleged unlawful activity may
nevertheless be implicated in illicit section 1983 conduct.'39
Since the Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits against
state governments in federal courts, 4 ' federal intervention is
134. See Scher v. Board of Educ., 424 F.2d 741, 743 (3d Cir. 1970); Bonanno v.
Thomas, 309 F.2d 320, 321 (9th Cir. 1962); Nanez v. Ritger, 304 F. Supp. 354, 356
(E.D. Wis. 1969).
135. 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346
(1879)).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under
Color of" Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323 (1992) (discussing the historical meaning of
"under color of law').
137. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1969); cf. Williams v. United States, 341
U.S. 97, 99-100 (1951) (defining "under color of law" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 242);
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1945) (same); United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (same).
138. Duzynski v. Nosal, 324 F.2d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 1963); Spampinato v. M.
Breger & Co., 270 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 944 (1960); see
also District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1973) (noting that section
1983 does not provide relief against private or federal actions).
139. See Fulton v. Emerson Elec. Co., 420 F.2d 527, 530 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970); Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F.2d 780, 788 (5th Cir. 1958).
140. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
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only permitted when a claim is against culpable state
officers.' 4 ' State prosecutors who are charged with enforcing
state laws are appropriate section 1983 defendants.
142
The Supreme Court has recognized that state officials need
some level of immunity from section 1983 lawsuits.
141
Immunity reflects the notion that absent bad faith it would be
unjust to subject an individual officer to liability merely
because of his position. 144 Two species of immunity are
identified by the courts: absolute and qualified. Absolute
immunity against damages actions predicated on official
actions is extended to those who perform presidential, 4
legislative, 46 judicial,'147 and prosecutorial 4 functions. Those
officers not qualifying for the above immunity have been
provided a qualified "good faith" immunity defense. The
controlling test for granting this defense focuses on whether
the official's discretionary conduct violated "clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." 49
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.; see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974) (stating that the "[Supreme] Court has consistently held that
an unconsenting state is immune from suits brought in federal court by her own
citizens as well as by citizens of another State"); cf Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18,
24 (1933) (noting that states could waive the immunity from suits granted by the
Eleventh Amendment); Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 232 (1872) (stating that
a state cannot claim Eleventh Amendment immunity in the context of its contractual
obligations). The Amendment's prohibitive reach does not, however, extend to suits
by the United States government against an individual state, United States v.
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965), suits between two States, Colorado v. New
Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 182 n.9 (1982), or suits against municipal corporations or other
political subdivisions, Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
141. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-59 (1908) (stating that federal
courts of equity may enjoin individuals acting as officers of the state from committing
unconstitutional acts); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518-19 (1898) (noting that a
suit against a state officer is not a suit against the state within the meaning of the
Eleventh Amendment, meaning immunity does not extend to state officials).
142. Cf Young, 209 U.S. at 161 (finding that a state attorney is not immune from
a suit in equity under the Fourteenth Amendment for enforcing unconstitutional
state laws).
143. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529 (1984) (discussing immunity of
state judges); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-60 (1978) (same); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 246-49 (1974) (discussing the immunity of higher officers of
the executive branch of state government).
144. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240.
145. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748-49 (1982).
146. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 614-16 (1972).
147. Stump, 435 U.S. at 363.
148. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976) (holding that a prosecutor
is immune from a civil damages suit for enforcing state law).
149. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (establishing an objective
standard for qualified immunity protection for government officials).
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Where a section 1983 suit seeks relief in the form of
monetary damages, state prosecutors performing quasi-judicial
functions are afforded absolute immunity.150 This immunity,
however, does not extend to suits seeking injunctive relief.15 1
C. The Potential Obstacles Confronting a Section 1983
Suit for Physician Aid-in-Dying
In recent years, the Supreme Court has imposed additional
burdens for remedying constitutional violations under section
1983. First, in an effort to distinguish due process from tradi-
tional tort principles, a section 1983 victim must demonstrate
that the rights violation was not the result of mere negligence.
A valid section 1983 cause of action arises only when it is
alleged that a state government or its agents acted intention-
ally.'52 In the context of physician aid to an ailing patient, this
requirement is easily satisfied. The very act of criminalizing
suicide-assistance conduct is the result of a conscious decision
by both legislators in codifying and prosecutors in enforcing
the law. The goal of state laws against physician aid-in-dying
is to directly interfere with, if not suspend outright, the liberty
of a patient. The intentionality requirement is therefore
manifest in the state prohibitions.
A second limitation on section 1983 claims is the condition
that a plaintiff exhaust state post-deprivation remedies when
the allegedly unconstitutional conduct is random, that is, not
caused by established procedures.'53 If a state otherwise
provides adequate post-deprivation compensation, a plaintiff
may be denied federal relief. This standard was first
articulated in Parratt v. Taylor.'54
In Parratt, a Nebraska inmate filed a section 1983 claim
alleging that the negligent denial of a $23.50 hobby kit by
prison officials constituted a deprivation of property, and thus
150. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31.
151. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 736-37 (1980);
see infra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
152. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986) (rejecting negligence as a
basis for a violation of due process claim); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-33
(1986) (same).
153. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981).
154. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
WINTER 19941 Physician Aid-in-Dying 545
a violation of due process. 155 The Supreme Court held that the
prisoner failed to establish a colorable section 1983 claim. The
Court decided that a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing by a
state is impracticable when the property deprivation is the
result of a "random and unauthorized" act by a state agent.1
56
The existence of post-deprivation procedures for the reim-
bursement of the lost property was all the process due
Parratt.1
57
In the years since, there has been much debate both in the
high court and the lower courts over the parameters of
Parratt. A brief survey of subsequent, related cases helps to
clarify the implications for section 1983 suits in physician aid-
in-dying. In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,158 the Court
found that Parratt's endorsement of post-deprivation remedies
did not apply to situations where the property deprivation is
the result of an established state procedure.' 59 The Court's
distinction parallels the requirement in section 1983 suits that
the injurious conduct be in an official, rather than personal,
capacity.
60
After Logan, the issue became whether Parratt's analysis was
equally germane to intentional, rather than negligent, property
deprivations. The Court in Hudson v. Palmer'61 found that such
a distinction was unfounded.'62 Reiterating its position in Logan,
the Court emphasized that the controlling issue in Parratt was
the State's ability to provide a pre-deprivation hearing, not the
negligence or intent accompanying the deprivation conduct.
63
The most recent controversy, one more on point for physician
155. Id. at 529-31.
156. Id. at 539-41.
157. Id. at 543-44.
158. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
159. Id. at 435-36. In distinguishing Parratt from the case at bar, the Court noted
"Parratt ... was dealing with a '... random and unauthorized act by a State
employee ... [and was] not a result of some established State procedure.'" Continu-
ing, the Court concluded that Parratt "was not designed to reach ... a situation"
where the deprived right is the product of state policy. Id. (quoting Parratt, 451 U.S.
at 436).
160. See supra Part II.B.
161. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
162. Id. at 533. The Court stated: "We can discern no logical distinction between
negligent and intentional deprivations of property insofar as the 'practicability' of
affording pre-deprivation process is concerned. The state can no more anticipate and
control in advance the random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its employees
than it can anticipate similar negligent conduct." Id.
163. Id. at 534.
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aid-in-dying, is whether Parratt encompasses liberty, as well
as property, deprivations.
The Supreme Court attempted to answer this question in
Zinermon v. Burch. 6 4 There, a medicated and allegedly dis-
oriented hospital patient authorized his own commitment to
a Florida State mental institution. The patient subsequently
brought a section 1983 suit against the physicians, adminis-
trators, and staff members at the hospital contending that,
because at the time of his "voluntary" admission he was
incompetent to give the required informed consent, his
admission violated his constitutional liberty.16 Relying on
Parratt and Hudson, the hospital argued that the patient's
complaint was facially deficient because it alleged only a
"random, unauthorized violation" of state regulations by the
hospital staff.
166
The Court rejected the hospital's defense, concluding that
since the state specifically delegated liberal authority to the
hospital to admit patients to mental institutions and thereby
deprive those patients of substantial liberty, the hospital's use
of that authority was neither random nor unauthorized.
67
Ironically, the Court also rejected the patient's argument that
a deprivation of liberty is qualitatively different from a
deprivation of property.
168
Despite these efforts to clarify Parratt, Parratt's applicability
to a federal cause of action for physician aid-in-dying remains
questionable. As Zinermon confirmed, Parratt's due process
treatment does not extend to established state practices.
Numerous lower courts have interpreted Zinermon as compel-
ling the meticulous scrutiny of a state's "random and unautho-
rized" defense. 69 It thus appears that state post-deprivation
164. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
165. Id. at 114-15.
166. Id. at 115.
167. Id. at 138.
168. Id. at 132. The Court stated that "[w]e... do not find support in precedent
for a categorical distinction between a deprivation of liberty and one of property." Id.
(citations omitted). The Court maintained that "where the State is truly unable to
anticipate and prevent a random deprivation of a liberty interest" the application of
the Parrat rule is not automatically precluded by the nature of the interest. Id. at
132. However, the Court conveniently overlooked Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion in Parratt, which specifically noted that the principles motivating a post-
deprivation remedy for an inexpensive hobby kit do not lend themselves to the more
substantive considerations of life or liberty. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
169. Lowe v. Scott, 959 F.2d 323, 341 (1st Cir. 1992); Caine v. Hardy, 943 F.2d
1406, 1413 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474 (1992).
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remedies will only satisfy due process concerns when the
conduct questioned under section 1983 is truly unforesee-
able. 170
Laws against physician aid-in-dying are certainly exempt
from the Parratt standards, since codified criminal proscrip-
tions are part of a state's policy, and neither random nor
unauthorized. 171 Under section 1983, actions of state employ-
ees are attributable to a state if those actions conform to a
state's expressed policy.172 Finally, if Parratt is read as
protecting due process through post-deprivation remedies for
constitutionally illicit state policies, then Parratt is funda-
mentally at odds with Monroe v. Pape.'73 Such an interpreta-
tion would strain Parratt and its subsequent treatment beyond
reason. Monroe's meaning is plain: deprivation of a constitu-
tional right without prior procedures for comment or protest
violates due process. 74 Unless and until Monroe is overturned,
the Court should not disturb the substantive guarantees that
have been in place for more than three decades.
D. Section 1983 Implications for
Physician Aid-in-Dying
This portion of the Note explores two potential classes of
defendants in section 1983 suits initiated by patients in
redressing physician aid-in-dying: state prosecutors and
hospitals.
1. State Prosecuting Attorneys-A patient's section 1983
suit against a prosecuting attorney would seek to estop the
criminal prosecution of a physician who facilitates the death
of a patient. The strength of this preemptive strategy is
derived from the landmark decision of Ex parte Young.'75 At
170. Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1402 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1067 (1991).
171. See supra notes 153-69 and accompanying text.
172. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 477-79 (1986); Monell v. New
York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
173. 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see Vail v. Board of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435, 1454-55 (7th
Cir. 1983) (Esbach, J., concurring) (discussing the conflict between Parratt and
Monroe).
174. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 169-72 (1961) (finding that petitioners present
a solid claim under section 1983 where their home is searched and one is arrested
without warrants regardless of post-deprivation remedies available through state
law).
175. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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issue in Young was whether then Attorney General for the
State of Minnesota, Edward T. Young, could be enjoined from
enforcing a Minnesota law regulating railroad transit rates
held to be unconstitutional. 176 Young's defense rested with the
Eleventh Amendment's prohibition of lawsuits against a state
by a private citizen. 177 Young maintained that any action
against his person as Attorney General was, in effect, an
action against the State of Minnesota, and thus violative of
the Eleventh Amendment.
178
The Supreme Court resoundingly rejected Young's argu-
ment. The Court attributed its decision to a line of cases
dating back to 1824.171 Justice Peckham best summarized the
essence of the precedent by declaring:
[Individuals who, as officers of the State, are clothed
with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of
the State, and who threaten and are about to commence
proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce
against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating
the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal
Court of equity from such action. 8 °
Such lawsuits filed against state officers are not precluded by
the Eleventh Amendment.
The Court specifically considered the appropriateness of
injunctive relief against a state official.' 8 ' Young claimed that
because the Minnesota Attorney General had no statutory duty
to enforce the law in every instance, the Court was not
permitted to "control him as Attorney General in the exercise
of his discretion."' Again the Court was unpersuaded.
Although agreeing with the general proposition that courts are
not to interfere with legitimate prosecutorial discretion, the
Court held that there is no impermissible interference when
an officer is merely enjoined from enforcing an unconstitutional
176. Id. at 148-49.
177. Id. at 149.
178. Id. at 159.
179. Id. at 150-55.
180. Id. at 155-56.
181. Id. at 152-60.
182. Id. at 158.
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act.183 Where there is a conflict between state and federal laws,
a state cannot claim immunity to protect its officers from
suit.184
The ramifications for physician aid-in-dying are clear. Young
and its progeny stand for the proposition that Eleventh
Amendment concerns are not implicated in suits against state
officers, including state prosecutors. Like Edward T. Young,
Michigan prosecutor John O'Hair and his counterparts across
the country are responsible in their official capacity for
prosecuting those who violate laws outlawing assisted suicide.
In this context, injunctive relief is appropriate as it would both
prevent the enforcement of unconstitutional state laws and
preserve patients' federal rights.
A more difficult question is whether state prosecutors, even
in the absence of absolute immunity, are qualifiedly immune
from section 1983 litigation. The case law is unclear. In
Mitchell v. Forsyth,"8 5 the Supreme Court reconsidered the
standard for qualified immunity originally articulated in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,'8 6 namely that government officials are
not liable for civil damages "insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."" 7 The Court
emphasized that Harlow does not, and should not, immunize
state officers when "an official could be expected to know that
his [sic] conduct would violate statutory or constitutional
rights ... ."1"s The Harlow rule both liberalizes and restricts
relief under section 1983. While qualified immunity allows
courts to define narrowly the class of persons entitled to
absolute immunity and thereby increase the number of
possible defendants against whom a plaintiff could file a
section 1983 suit, plaintiffs are not at liberty to subject offi-
cials to litigation for every perceived encroachment. As Harlow
noted, the failure to recognize immunity for good-faith
performance of duty where appropriate is costly."8 9 Trials
183. Id. at 159. (noting that "[an injunction, to prevent [an officer] from doing that
which he has no legal right to do is not an interference with the discretion of an
officer").
184. Id. at 159-60.
185. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
186. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
187. Id. at 818.
188. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819).
189. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
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distract officials from their governmental duties, inhibit
prosecutorial discretion, and deter citizens from entering
public service. 9 °
A common misconception limits Harlow's efficacy. In some
courts, qualified immunity has presented an insurmountable
obstacle to plaintiffs seeking section 1983 relief. In Benson v.
Allphin,'9' for example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit upheld the qualified immunity of the
Director and Assistant Director of the Illinois Department of
Revenue against an allegation of wrongful termination stem-
ming from comments made by an employee. Although pur-
porting to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, the court decided it was not clearly established that
the actions of the defendants violated plaintiff's First Amend-
ment rights.'92 The court attempted to apply the Harlow
analysis, but discovered that it did not adequately define
"clearly established statutory or constitutional rights," the
pivotal phrase affording qualified immunity. 93 More specifi-
cally, the Benson court found significant ambiguity regarding
the courts whose decisions may establish "clearly established"
constitutional rights.' 94 The majority expressed reservations
about an exclusive focus on Supreme Court jurisprudence,
given the infrequence with which that Court hears cases on
the issue.'95 Moreover, the court went on to question the belief
that any issue of law dependent on a balancing test can ever
be "clearly established."96 Ultimately, the Court resolved the
immunity issue through a balancing of the countervailing
interests.
97
Benson illustrates the improper application of Harlow. First,
Harlow is a rights-based approach. It explicitly requires a
court to focus on the allegedly deprived right. Benson,
however, subordinates the plaintiff's claimed liberty to an
investigation of the defendants' conduct.' The court noted
that at oral argument the defendants conceded that evidence
amply demonstrated that their actions were motivated by
190. Id. at 814, 816.
191. 786 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986).
192. Id. at 277-78.
193. Id. at 275.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 276.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights.' 99 The court
paid little attention to this admission. Second, since qualified
immunity is an affirmative defense, it is the defendant who
must bear the evidentiary burden. This burden of proof
requires that the defendant, not the plaintiff, demonstrate by
a preponderance of the evidence that the constitutional right
alleged to have been deprived is not "clearly established." A
plaintiff, therefore, should enjoy a presumption that the rights
violated are explicitly constitutional. Benson, however, denied
relief because the plaintiff had not clearly demonstrated a
denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, Benson's approach
is inconsistent with Mitchell v. Forsyth."'
In Mitchell, the United States Supreme Court declared that
Harlow's authority is predicated on a recognition that the
public interest is best served when an official's duties are
exercised in instances where clearly established rights are not
implicated.2 ' The public interest is not served when officials
act upon rights whose constitutionality is in question. As
Harlow suggests, when a prosecutor has doubts about the
constitutionality of the rights to be infringed, she should be
made to hesitate.0 2 Thus, in a jurisprudence inclined, if not
devoted, to the protection of federal rights, state officials
accused of unlawful deprivation of constitutional rights must
bear the burden of justifying their actions. To require plain-
tiffs to prove that a right is "clearly established" when they
may be in the process of asking a court to answer that very
question undermines the function of section 1983.
2. Hospitals-Hospitals, public and private, may be
vulnerable to section 1983 suits. Medical facilities owned and
managed by a state have long been recognized as proper
defendants in claims of federal rights deprivations.20 3 The
potential liability of private hospitals is more questionable.0 4
199. Id. at 276-77.
200. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
201. Id. at 525.
202. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982).
203. See, e.g., Wofford v. Glynn Brunswick Memorial Hosp., 864 F.2d 117, 118
(11th Cir. 1989); Tarabishi v. McAlester Regional Hosp., 827 F.2d 648, 651-52 (10th
Cir. 1987); Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 6-9 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910
(1978); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1974); Meredith v. Allen County
War Memorial Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1968).
204. Compare Ruffler v. Phelps Memorial Hosp., 453 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (finding that a private hospital was a state actor because it performed public
function) with Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding that a
private hospital was not a state actor because its conduct failed to satisfy public
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Since section 1983 relief is generally not available against
individuals who act in a personal rather than official capacity,
a similar limitation is imposed on entities. Yet, there is ample
evidence to the contrary.0 5
Courts hearing the issue of hospital liability usually con-
centrate on the receipt of public financial support. The most
common source of federal funding to private hospitals is in the
form of Hill-Burton programs. 2 6 The Hill-Burton finances pro-
vide public and not-for-profit private medical centers with
funds for construction or renovation of facilities. Some federal
circuit courts have held that receipt of Hill-Burton funds by a
private hospital may establish a sufficient state connection to
be considered action under "color of state law" for section
1983.207 This stems from the fact that to qualify for the federal
program, the state within which the hospital is located must
submit a comprehensive plan justifying the expansion and
detailing state mechanisms for enforcing minimum standards
of care and operation.
A more tenable justification for holding private hospitals
liable "under color of law" is the influence of state regulatory
and statutory measures. At least one federal court has had the
opportunityto consider the issue. In Doe v. Charleston Area
function, state compulsion, or nexus/joint action tests). The "public function" theory
of imputing state action to private hospitals is consistent with the Supreme Court's
treatment of other private actors. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
157-66 (1978) (holding that the actions of a private actor are attributable to the state
only if those actions are traditionally held exclusively by the state or the state
compels the action); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974)
(asserting that a private actor may be treated as a state actor where nexus between
state and private actions is sufficiently close).
205. See, e.g., Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer Hosp., Inc., 437 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1971)
(finding that where members of a hospital's board of directors, under the hospital's
charter, were responsible to the public, the hospital's conduct constituted state
action); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964) (finding that where a purely
private hospital's deed contained a reverter clause permitting the city or county to
convert building for other purposes, the hospital's conduct is controlled sufficiently
by the state to be considered state action); Sokol v. University Hosp., Inc., 402
F. Supp. 1029 (D. Mass. 1975) (finding state action where hospital accreditation
process integrated state and federal licensing).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1988).
207. See Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Ass'n, 523 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1975); O'Neill
v. Grayson County War Memorial Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140, 1143-44 (6th Cir. 1973);
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 938 (1964); Chiaffitelli, 437 F.2d at 430. But see Loh-Seng Yo v. Cibola Gen.
Hosp., 706 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1983); Modaber v. Culpeper Memorial Hosp., 674 F.2d
1023, 1026 (4th Cir. 1982); Briscoe v. Bock, 540 F.2d 392, 394 (8th Cir. 1976); Ward
v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671, 674-75 (10th Cir. 1973).
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Medical Center, Inc. (CAMC),20 8 a twenty-one year-old unmar-
ried student brought a section 1983 class action suit alleging
that the hospital's prohibition of all but emergency abortions
amounted to State actions for the assessment of the rights
deprivation. Although the plaintiff succeeded in finding a
physician with staff privileges at the hospital willing to
perform the previability abortion, the Charleston Area Medical
Center refused. The District Court denied the plaintiff's
complaint on the grounds that she had failed to establish
irreparable harm. The Fourth Circuit reversed. Finding that
the hospitals's policy on abortion "faithfully followed" the West
Virginia criminal abortion statute, the court concluded that
such compliance established a sufficiently close nexus between
the state and the hospital to be treated as state action. °9
The court relied on Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. 210 for the
review of the hospital's policy. The Adickes standard for
determining if an act is done "under color of law" requires a
showing of two facts: (1) the existence of a state-enforced
custom; and (2) that the private actor was motivated by that
state-enforced custom. 211 This standard is relevant to physi-
cian aid-in-dying. At its most rudimentary level, state action
may be imputed to private conduct when such conduct is
compelled by state law.212 The court went on to say that state
regulation need not reach the level of compulsion "to clothe
what is otherwise private conduct with 'state action.' ,
213
In resolving the further issue of irreparable injury, the
Court held in accordance with Roe v. Wade2 4 and Doe v.
Bolton215 that denial of a first-term abortion violated the right
to be let alone and could cause psychological trauma.21 '
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the West Virginia
abortion statute and its effect on private hospitals provides
208. 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975). But see Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp.,
513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975) (concluding that where private hospital's board of
directors had exclusive control over medical policy, state action could not be impli-
cated in the performance or nonperformance of elective abortions, even though
hospital leased premises from county).
209. CAMC, 529 F.2d at 645.
210. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
211. Id. at 173-74.
212. CAMC, 529 F.2d at 643-44.
213. Id. (quoting Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964)).
214. 410 US. 113 (1973).
215. 410 US: 170 (1973).
216. CAMC, 529 F.2d at 644.
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some insight on the issue of physician aid-in-dying. In many
ways, the problems are indistinguishable. Like the young
woman in CAMC, Thomas Hyde and Dr. Ali Khalili were able
to enlist Jack Kevorkian, but were prevented from carrying
out their plans in a hospital setting because of state laws. The
coercive effect of the West Virginia abortion statute on private
hospitals is directly analogous to hospital policies prohibiting
the active assistance of patient suicides by doctors. The
Fourteenth Amendment ramifications cannot be easily
dismissed.
III. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
PHYSICIAN AID-IN-DYING
A comprehensive evaluation of a section 1983 cause of action
for physician assistance in patient deaths necessarily entails
an examination of the likely effects on public policy.
A. Federal Involvement Eliminates
Disparity Among the States
In Cruzan,217 Justice O'Connor argued that the authority to
protect individual liberty interests in the context of life-saving
or life-ending medicine should be delegated to the laboratory
of the states.218 In the time since Cruzan, opponents of
physician aid-in-dying have argued that Justice O'Connor's
advice manifests a desire by the Court not to encourage fed-
eral initiatives. This assumption, however, is incorrect.
Justice O'Connor's admonition is viewed more accurately as
an indication of the Court's continued concern for principles of
federalism 219 and an appreciation of a lack of state consensus
on the issue of physician aid-in-dying. It does not, as some
217. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
218. Id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For an essay on Cruzan's reception in
the states, see Thomas A. Eaton & Edward J. Larson, Experimenting With the 'Right
to Die' in the Laboratory of the States, 25 GA. L. REV. 1253 (1991).
219. For a general understanding of the interplay between the principles of
federalism and section 1983, see Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and
Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959 (1987).
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contend, stand for a blanket prohibition of federal involve-
ment. Indeed, Justice O'Connor's opinion emphasizes that
Cruzan is only applicable to the practices of one state, and
specifically to the procedures for safeguarding the rights of
incompetent patients.22 ° Justice O'Connor does not speak to
decisions by rational and fully competent individuals to end a
painful existence.221
In this light, this Note maintains that Cruzan does not
govern the discussion of a federal claim for physician assis-
tance in patient deaths. The Court's history is replete with
rulings which establish the federal parameters for novel
rights. Physician aid-in-dying deserves similar consider-
222
ation.
Judicial uncertainty over the constitutionality of physician
action to hasten patient deaths has resulted in a series of
conflicting state decisions.223 In practice, the strength of a
patient's interest is largely dependent upon the jurisdiction
hearing the case. The right-to-die cases are illustrative of the
schizophrenic nature of state holdings. Some parties will be
successful, 224 while others similarly situated will not,225 lead-
ing to the conclusion that the disparate impact in the
laboratory of the states is unfair.226 It is also antithetical to
federal rights jurisprudence. A federal alternative is entirely
consistent with Congress' prerogative to protect against
deprivations of constitutional rights.227
220. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990).
221. Id.
222. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
223. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271-77.
224. E.g., Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C.
1985); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1978); Bergstadt v. McKay, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev.
1990); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233-37 (N.J. 1985).
225. E.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286-87; In re Westchester County Medical Ctr., 531
N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67-68 (N.Y. 1981).
226. The incidence of travel by women from states prohibiting abortions to states
permitting abortions in the years preceding Roe is enlightening. In 1972, approxi-
mately 44% of all legal abortions performed in the United States involved women who
were not residents of the state where the abortion was performed. NANETTE J. DAVIS,
FROM CRIME TO CHOICE-THE TRANSFORMATION OF ABORTION IN AMERICA 228 (1985). By
contrast, two years after Roe, that number had decreased to 13.4%. Id. Although
similar statistics do not exist for people who travel to states which do not criminalize
the practice of physician aid-in-dying, at least one of Kevorkian's "patients," Dr. Ali
Khalili, traveled from Illinois to Michigan to retain Kevorkian's services. Robert
Ourlian, Tape: Kevorkian's Last Patient Wanted Quick End to His Pain, DETROIT NEWS,
Jan. 23, 1994, at 1C.
227. See supra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
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The patchwork of state laws on physician aid-in-dying
should also inspire federal involvement because of the conse-
quences for interstate commerce. The discussion of this issue
deserves more analysis than this Note is able to allocate. In
the context of abortion, one commentator observed that state
methods which bar women from seeking the refuge of a state
which offers easier access to abortion are "repugnant" to the
commerce clause.228 State laws that interfere with the
movement of citizens of the United States from one state to
another because their activities are morally contested are
impermissible. 229 The right to unimpeded interstate travel is
fundamental.2 ° This Note borrows much of its opinion on the
interplay between physician aid-in-dying and the interstate
commerce clause from that commentator's comparable
thoughts on abortion. Laws obstructing the travel of patients
from states criminalizing physician aid-in-dying to states
which do not conflict with the precepts of the commerce clause,
and thus warrant federal protection.
B. A Federal Cause of Action for Physician Aid-in-Dying
Comports with Standing Requirements
Generally, for a plaintiff to establish a cognizable claim for
federal court review, three requirements must be satisfied.
First, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered or will suffer an
injury. Second, a plaintiff must prove that the injury inflicted
is fairly traceable to defendant's conduct. Third, a plaintiff
must allege that a favorable court verdict will redress the
injury sustained.23' In addition to these three basic elements,
the Supreme Court has identified a series of supplemental
228. Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right
to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
451, 488 (1992); see also, In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315, at
*16-*17 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1991) (stating that "forum shop[ping]" in order to find
less stringent scrutiny of decisions to remove life-sustaining treatment is
impermissible); Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, The Right
to Life, and The Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. 873, 903-05 (1993) (arguing that "the
right to travel would entail an interstate right to die").
229. Id. (citing Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981)).
230. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972).
231. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
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principles limiting standing.232 Most relevant in this instance
is the requirement that a party assert only his rights and not
those of a third party.
33
Patients who wish to avail themselves of physician assis-
tance in their deaths have sufficient personal concern in the
controversy to justify litigation.234 Implicit in Cruzan's distrust
of surrogate decision making in the withdrawal of lifesaving
treatment is the notion that a surrogate is inherently unable
to exercise the patient's "personal" choice.2 35 Absent evidence
of the patient's desires, the Court was reluctant to immunize
substituted judgment from the reach of state police power. The
recognition by the Court that the resolution to die is deeply
personal2 36 illustrates the continued relevance and influence
of standing.
The standing criteria creates other interesting implications
for active assistance by doctors in patient deaths. Of the
individual elements, proof of injury may be the most onerous
burden imposed on a patient seeking injunctive relief. Few
courts have held that a law which results in the continued
existence of a person is a harm justiciable by the federal
judiciary.2 37
The imminence of the injury may also bar standing. Because
state prosecutors may decide in their discretion not to prose-
cute a physician who assists in a patient's death, the state
may argue that there was no injury in fact. In City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons,238 the Supreme Court determined the
appropriateness of injunctive and declaratory relief against
the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) for the use of
"chokeholds" in arrests where the victim does not threaten
232. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-502 (1975).
233. Id. at 499.
234. Cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (holding that a plaintiff must
show "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions").
235. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
236. Id. at 284.
237. Compare Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 453 (Mass.
1979) (ordering prison inmate to undergo lifesaving hemodialysis treatments to
uphold orderly prison administration) with In re Garrett, 547 A.2d 609, 614 (Del. Ch.
1988) (granting a petition seeking guardianship of mentally impaired inmate who
refused nourishment, even though the court felt denying the right to starvation to a
competent inmate would result in "chilling cruelty").
238. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
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deadly force.239 The Court held that federal courts could not
hear Lyons's petition for injunctive relief.240 Central to the
Court's ruling was its determination that the threat of future
injury to Lyons was merely conjectural.24' To establish a
controversy meriting federal review, the Court said that Lyons
would have to prove one of two "incredible assertions," either:
(1) that all police officers in the LAPD always employed the
chokehold when confronting a citizen or (2) that the city
ordered or authorized police officers to use the chokehold in
this manner.242 Since the LAPD manual did not suggest using
chokeholds to combat unresisting arrestees, the Court ruled
that the future threat to Lyons's person was not genuine.243
The Lyons rule strikingly is inapplicable to section 1983
suits challenging state interference in physician aid-in-dying.
An interpretation of Lyons as precluding constitutional
challenges to state laws where a victim can only demonstrate
potential future enforcement is fundamentally at odds with Ex
Parte Young.244 In Young, one of the defenses raised by the
State of Minnesota was that prosecutorial discretion safe-
guarded malicious or unconstitutional enforcement of the
laws.245 The Court rejected this argument.246 Young's reasoning
should be dispositive of Lyons's standing requirement as well.
Prosecutorial discretion is immaterial when the law which
may be enforced conflicts with the guarantees of the federal
constitution. 247 The Court declared that by virtue of statutory
authority, a state attorney general has a duty to enforce the
laws of the state.2 4' The Court concluded that the power,
duties and function of the attorney general meant that these
state officers were properly included as parties to litigation
239. Id. at 97-98. The complaint alleged that Lyons was stopped by members of
the LAPD for a traffic or vehicle code violation. At some point during the encounter,
the officers seized Lyons and without provocation applied a "chokehold." Lyons lost
consciousness as a result of the maneuver and suffered damage to his larynx. Id.
240. Id. at 101.
241. Id. at 102-03 (finding that past exposure to illegal conduct was evidence of
a threat of repeated injury but that the probability of future harm in this case rested
on the likelihood of plaintiff's rearrest).
242. Id. at 105-06.
243. Id. at 110. In fact, the Court went so far as to say "[absent a sufficient
likelihood that [Lyons] will again be wronged in a similar way, Lyons is no more
entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles .... " Id. at 111.
244. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
245. Id. at 158; see supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
246. Young, 209 U.S. at 158-59.
247. Id. at 159-60.
248. Id. at 161.
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under the Fourteenth Amendment.249 In light of Young,
neither a person nor a physician considering to assist another
in dying may be prosecuted. This fact should not deny a
plaintiff standing in federal court.
Standing can be easily satisfied within the parameters
established by Lyons. The court, in that case, found that a
plaintiff could present a justiciable controversy by showing
that the city ordered or authorized police officers to act in a
manner consistent with the complained of conduct.25 ° By
analogy, for a patient to access the federal judiciary, she
simply would have to prove that the state gave prosecuting
attorneys the authority to prosecute those who violate criminal
prohibitions of assisted suicide.
C. Physician Aid-in-Dying Does Not
Constitute State Endorsed Suicide
At common law, suicide and assisted suicide were crimes.2"'
The justification for including these activities in the penal
code stemmed from three sources. First, suicide was thought
to be offensive to God252 and Biblical teachings." 3 One result
of this belief was the ignominious burial of the victim's body.
Instead of a churchyard, the more frequent practice was to
drive a stake through the body and bury the person at the
crossroads of a highway.254 Second, by depriving the monarchy
of a subject, suicide was considered a crime against the
Crown.255 Third, there was the concern for protecting defense-
less persons, including the suicide victim himself.25 Those who
assisted in the criminal act of suicide were likewise guilty of
249. Id.
250. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983).
251. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 188-89 (1854).
252. Id. at 189.
253. Hales v. Petit, 75 Eng. Rep. 387, 400 (1565). One of the most comprehensive
treatments of suicide as a religious crime can be found in GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE
SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1957).
254. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 251, at 190.
255. Id. at 189.
256. This thought reflects the contemporary notion that those who contemplate
suicide are physically or mentally ill and in need of medical assistance, not discipline.
Maria T. CeloCruz, Aid-in-Dying: Should We Decriminalize Physician-Assisted
Suicide and Physician-Committed Euthanasia?, 18 AM. J. L. & MED. 369, 375 (1992).
WINTER 19941 559
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 27:2
a crime.257 With the independence of America, the appease-
ment of the monarchy and God as official state policy became
impermissible. Thus, the only viable reason for the proscrip-
tion of suicide today remains the protection of vulnerable
persons.258
This reasoning is still compelling, as Cruzan attests.259
Nonetheless, the prudence of this policy is questionable when
the individual whose life is at issue is competent. Along these
lines, one commentator has remarked:
[T]he state's paternalistic concern evaporates if the sui-
cidal individual is demonstrably rational. Thus, if states
can legislate adequate safeguards to ensure the rationality
of those who wish to commit suicide, a limited right to
suicide and suicide assistance can be granted consistent
with the state's historical interest in suicide prevention.26 °
Echoing this argument, one judge has posited that the imple-
mentation of regulatory procedures which facilitate rational
decisions to die actually might dissuade people from resorting
to Kevorkian-type practitioners, and encourage them to receive
professional counseling.261 It would seem, therefore, that the
conditions in which a state may exercise legitimately its police
power to criminalize assisted suicide depends on the
rationality of the decision.
This Note contends that the most salient distinction between
rational and irrational decisions to die is the presence of an
objectively verifiable terminal or unbearably painful medical
condition. Involving a physician, perhaps subject to review by
a hospital ethics committee, in the evaluative process should
quiet many of the concerns about potential abuse. Many states
already acknowledge this distinction.262
257. State v. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854, 856-57 (N.C. 1961).
258. CeloCruz, supra note 256, at 375-76.
259. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281-83 (1990).
260. CeloCruz, supra note 256, at 376.
261. Michigan v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec.
13, 1993).
262. The Missouri Supreme Court accurately depicted the landscape within the
states in Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). The court then
went on to identify 54 cases in 16 states supporting their conclusion. Id. at 412-13
n.4. The court noted that "[n]early unanimously, those courts [of our sister states]
have found a way to allow persons wishing to die ... to meet the end sought.' Id. at
413. Justice Blackmar's dissent is particularly persuasive. In reference to the cases
cited by the majority, he counseled: "Many other judges have struggled with problems
560
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In McKay v. Bergstedt,263 for example, the Nevada Supreme
Court held that a curable affliction is patently distinguishable
from illnesses where the primary issues are "when, for how
long and at what cost to the individual [his] life may be briefly
extended."21 4 The Bergstedt decision is even more impressive
when it is revealed that the Court also believed that the State
of Nevada's interest in Bergstedt's life was "compelling and
fundamental.""2 The factual background of the case centered
on Kenneth A. Bergstedt, a thirty-one year-old mentally
competent quadriplegic. Bergstedt's quadriplegia resulted from
a swimming accident at the age of ten. He had lived with his
disability for twenty-one years prior to his petition. Bergstedt
was also ventilator dependent, his existence indefinitely
sustainable. The Court and all parties involved considered him
a non-terminal patient.266
Bergstedt had been raised and cared for all his life by his
father. Unfortunately, in the years immediately preceding the
petition, his father's own health was rapidly declining. Despite
his quadriplegia, Bergstedt could read, watch television, and
orally operate a computer. However, a life without his father
was an unbearable prospect. Bergstedt thus petitioned the
Nevada courts asking that they remove his ventilator and to
declare his ensuing death not a suicide.2 67 The Nevada
Supreme Court granted both of his requests. The court noted
that Nevada policy does not require that "every life must be
preserved against the will of the sufferer."
26 8
In distinguishing Bergstedt's death from "ordinary suicide,"
the court considered three factors: the patient's -attitude,
physical condition, and prognosis."' The court declared that
the preservation of life by the state only relates to meaningful
life270 and that "only the sufferer can determine the value of
continuing mortality."27'
similar to the ones before us. Their opinions demonstrate this struggle .... The
conclusion of the judges who have wrestled with the issues is entitled to great weight,
and is significant in spite of difficulties of expression." Id. at 428 (Blackmar, J.,
dissenting).
263. 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
264. Id. at 623 (alteration in original) (quotations omitted).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 620.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 624 (citation omitted).
269. Id. at 625.
270. Id. at 626.
271. Id. at 624.
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Bergstedt is instructive on the constitutionality of physician
aid-in-dying since the plaintiff was both competent and non-
terminal. Although it is true that the opinion might be distin-
guished on the grounds that the hospital's involvement in his
death was merely passive, the logic can be extended easily to
more active forms of medical assistance. As the court made
clear:
Society had no right to force upon [an individual] the
obligation to remain alive under conditions that he con-
sidered to be anathema. To rule otherwise would place an
unwarranted premium on survival at the expense of
human dignity, quality of life, and the value that comes
from a natural and timely entrance [of death].272
Yet, Bergstedt is not an isolated example. Of the more than
thirty states codifying laws against the assistance, incitement,
or solicitation of suicide,273 only three individuals have been
convicted between 1920 and 1983.274 In criminal prosecutions
272. Id. at 627.
273. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(2) (1989) (manslaughter); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1103(A)(3) (Supp. 1993) (manslaughter); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (Michie
1993) (manslaughter); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1988) (felony); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-3-104(1)(b) (Supp. 1992) (manslaughter); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53(a)-56(a)(2) (1983)
(manslaughter if not caused by force, duress, or deception); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 645 (Supp. 1992) (Class F felony); FLA. STAT. ch. 782.08 (1992) (felony); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 707-702(1)(b) (1985) (manslaughter to cause another to commit suicide); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-31 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (Class 2 felony to induce
another to commit suicide); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2 (West 1986) (Class B felony
to cause another to commit suicide by force, duress, or deception); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3406 (Supp. 1993) (felony); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (1964) (Class D
crime); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 752.1027, § 7(1) (Supp. 1994) (felony); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.215 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (crime); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1994)
(felony); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-102, 45-5-105 (1985) (assisting in completed suicide
is criminal homicide; aiding failed suicide results in ten year jail sentence and
$50,000 fine); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1989) (Class IV felony); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:4 (1986) (Class B felony); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1982) (crime); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie Supp. 1994) (felony); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.30, 125.15(3)
(McKinney 1987) (Class E felony or second degree manslaughter); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-16-04 (Supp. 1993) (felony); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 813-815 (West 1991) (crime);
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125(1)(b) (1993) (second degree manslaughter); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2505 (1983) (felony); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-37 (1988) (Class 6 felony);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West 1994) (offense); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.36.060 (West 1988) (Class C felony ruled violative of the U.S. Constitution by
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, No. C94-119R (W.D. Wash. May 3, 1994)); Wis.
STAT. § 940.12 (1991-92) (Class D felony).
274. George C. Garbesi, The Law of Assisted Suicide, 3 ISSUES L. & MED. 93, 96
n.19 (1987).
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of physicians for assisted suicide, not one doctor has ever been
imprisoned. 5 The most recent manifestation of public uncer-
tainty over the criminality of physician aid-in-dying is the May
1994 acquittal of Dr. Jack Kevorkian for facilitating the death
of Thomas W. Hyde, Jr., a terminally ill man.27 Comments
made by jurors after the verdict reveal that there is support
for the proposition that restrictive state legislation in this area
is an impermissible intrusion into patient privacy.277 The jury
also apparently found credible Kevorkian's defense that, at
least with respect to legal liability, there is a difference
between conduct intended to assist in a suicide and conduct
intended to relieve pain but accompanied by death.
CONCLUSION
A federal cause of action for physician aid-in-dying is not the
remedy for eliminating patient suffering. It is, however, an
instrument through which individuals may, with the
assistance of personal clinicians, be offered a comprehensive
array of options. This Note maintains that diversity of choice
is preferable to one imposed by a state. A federal alternative
is therefore well supported by precedent, compassion, and
common sense. Motivating this argument is the belief that the
deeply personal nature of the implicated liberty and privacy
interests accompanying decisions about assisted death should
preclude a system predicated exclusively upon plenary state
authority. State interests in the welfare of its citizens, though
legitimate, are vulnerable to mitigation. As numerous state
courts have already observed, when faced with an increasingly
grim prognosis, the state's interest becomes secondary to the
comfort of the afflicted.
In this light, while states may be permitted, perhaps even
encouraged, to regulate physician assistance in patient deaths,
275. David R. Schanker, Of Suicide Machines, Euthanasia Legislation, and the
Health Care Crisis, 68 IND. L.J. 977, 986 n.41 (1993).
276. Michigan v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec.
13, 1993); see David Margolick, Jury Acquits Dr. Kevorkian of Illegally Aiding a
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1994, at.Al. The acquittal was the first attempt by
Michigan prosecutors to enforce the 1992 law against assisted suicide. Id.
277. Id. at A20. One juror who had cared for her terminally sister and father for
14 years remarked, "I don't feel it's our obligation to choose for someone else how
much pain and suffering they can go through." Id.
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absolute prohibitions of the practice through criminal sanctions
encroach upon the domain reserved to the Federal Constitution.
As the primary means of realizing constitutionally-endorsed
rights, section 1983 offers patients a unique opportunity to
challenge unduly restrictive state laws in federal courts. Until
and unless state legislatures take the initiative to devise laws
respecting the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of intimately
autonomous decision making, federal intervention is necessary
to stave off the inevitable crisis of rights in the states. The
citizenry of a more perfect union deserve no less.
